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Abstract 
This paper assesses the reality of corporate governance in Jordan. It identifies the framework of 
corporate governance, which has here been set into two dimensions – institutionalisations and 
regulations – and describes the five major principles of corporate governance. The study was carried out 
by interviews with key employees and the review of related laws and selected annual reports. The study 
found (1) basic shareholder rights were honoured in decision-making, except for large decisions such as 
major asset sales; (2) shareholders were not treated equitably in practice, although controllers sometimes 
took action and prohibited insider trading; (3) the role and rights of stakeholders in corporate governance 
were respected, and stakeholders had a number of legal protections, which were largely covered in 
Jordan's Company Law; (4) disclosure and transparency were observed to a large extent, although limited 
to quantity rather than quality, because Jordan has fully adopted IFRS and ISA and (5) boards largely 
fulfilled their responsibilities, as these are extensively defined by law and regulation. 
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Several authors such as Brown and Caylor 2006; Demirag, Sudarsanam and Wright 2000; 
Gregory 2004, Mangena and Chamisa 2008 revealed that financial crises and failures 
positively motivated both developed and developing countries to publish better corporate-
governance codes; these have changed the landscape of corporate governance – in other 
words, the rules that direct and organise a business's management structure and ownership 
(Brenes, Madrigal & Requena 2009). "Corporate governance comprises three different 
elements: the stockholders' assembly, the board of directors and the top management team" 
(Brenes et al. 2009, p.1). In general, corporate governance is the way the relationships among 
all parties with interests in the business are regulated and organised.  The aim is usually to 
maintain the rights not only of shareholders, but of all stakeholders (Clarke 2003; Kim 2006). 
It incorporates a commitment to the application of standards for disclosure and transparency. 
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) stated that: 
Corporate governance is the rules and practices that govern the relationship 
between the managers and shareholders of corporations, as well as stakeholders like 
employees and creditors. It contributes to growth and financial stability by 
reinforcement of market confidence, financial market integrity and economic 
efficiency (OECD 2004, p.1). 
 The concept of corporate governance refers to the rules and standards that 
define the relationship between company management and stakeholders associated with the 
company: employees, suppliers, lenders, creditors, consumers, shareholders and bondholders 
(Kim 2006). The Cadbury Committee report defines it as "the system by which companies 
are directed and controlled" (Dunne & Morris 2008, p. 176). It is generally known as the 
framework of rules, relationships, systems and processes within and by which authority is 
exercised and controlled in corporations (Dunne & Morris 2008). It concerns the ways in 
which a chief executive officer can enhance corporate performance and obtain a fair return on 
the corporations performance (Sueyoshi, Goto & Omi 2010). Also, it can be defined as the 
company’s relationship with its shareholders in particular and with all its stakeholders in 
general (Chatrudee 2006). The concept of institutional governance revolves around 
promoting and achieving justice and transparency of public shareholder companies 
(Anandarajah 2004).  
On the other hand, some commentators view institutional governance more narrowly, 
insisting that it is a fanciful term for the way managers and auditors fulfill their 
responsibilities to shareholders (Lin & Liu 2009).  
The purposes of this study are to present the current legislative environment and 
institutional framework of corporate governance in Jordan and to establish an approach to 
assess the practice of corporate governance. Specifically, the assessment approach evaluates 
corporate governance practices by comparing the principles of corporate governance issued 
by the OCED in 2004 with the current practices in Jordan. This study also explores the 
possibility of implementing the OECD code of corporate governance efficiently.  
The next section briefly reviews the principles of corporate governance issued in 1999 
by the OECD. Section 3 presents the reality of corporate governance in Jordan. Section 4 
presents the study methodology. Section 5 provides an assessment of corporate governance in 
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Principles of Corporate Governance 
 
During the last decade, the issue of corporate governance has been scrutinised by a number of 
international institutions such as the World Bank and the OECD; they sought to deal with this 
issue decisively (Abu-Tapanjeh 2009). In 1999, the OECD issued principles of corporate 
governance to support the development of legal and institutional frameworks (OECD 2004). 
The OECD principles were adopted by 30 member's countries (Abu-Tapanjeh 2009). These 
principles were concerned with applying corporate governance in both public and private 
companies, whether or not they traded in financial markets, to strengthen the efficiency of 
financial markets and the stability of the economy as a whole (Tariff 2006). Abu-Tapanjeh 
(2009) stated that the quality of corporate governance should be taken into account because it 
may contribute to increasing the efficiency of the economy, reducing the risk of crisis and 
introducing legitimacy into a market economy. 
The first OECD principle is to protect the rights of shareholders, a crucial issue in the 
concept of corporate governance (Clarke 2003). Murphy and Topyan (2005) stated that the 
most important aspect of corporate governance is to protect the small shareholders who are 
not active, rather than the large and active shareholders. Procedures that protect shareholders 
lead to confidence in the institution (Klapper & Love 2004). These procedures include 
maintaining clear shareholder records and applying guaranteed methods to register property; 
providing information on a timely and regular basis; ensuring shareholders' rights to 
participate and vote in general shareholders meetings; and selecting members of the board 
(King & Wen 2011). 
The second principle dictates that corporate governance should ensure the equitable 
treatment of all shareholders, including minority and foreign shareholders (OECD 2004). 
Strong implementation of corporate governance may enhance the a corporation's ability to 
protect the minority shareholders' rights (Chhaochharia & Laeven 2009). As all shareholders 
should have the same voting rights, they should be able to obtain sufficient information about 
their voting rights before they purchase shares.   
 The third principle focuses on the relationship between the corporation and 
stakeholders in creating value (OECD 2004). Sueyoshi et al. (2010) examined the 
relationship between governance variables, particularly composition and functions of the 
board of directors, and operational efficiency in Japanese firms. They found that efficient 
practices under the rules of corporate governance increase the value of the corporation.  
The fourth principle is that corporate governance should ensure that the disclosure and 
transparency of all the issues regarding the corporation are properly established (OECD 
2004). Enhancing transparency is one of the key attributes of corporate governance 
(Campbell & Keys 2002), and accurate and full disclosures should include the corporation's 
financial and operating results, objectives and strategies, ownership structure and governance 
(OECD 2004). Material information should be provided about members of the board of 
directors and key employees (Seal 2006). In addition, disclosure and transparency should 
demonstrate that the existence of policies and instructions are consistent with the laws and 
regulations relating to companies and to the nature of the business.  
The fifth principle outlines the responsibilities of the board of directors (OECD 2004):  
the corporate governance framework should ensure the company rules or directions, the 
mechanism by which the board oversees management, and the board’s accountability to the 
company's shareholders are all clearly observed particularly in Company Law. The board of 
directors should fulfill specific functions such as reviewing and monitoring all matters related 
to the performance of the corporation, selecting and monitoring key executives and 
developing a strategy for setting objectives (Hutchinson & Gul 2004). In addition, the board 
is in charge of reviewing plans and addressing gaps during the application of the business 
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process (Hutchinson & Gul 2004). In applying this principle actively, it is recommended that 
the chief executive officer and chairman positions should be separated (Black et al. 2010). 
 
Corporate Governance in Jordan  
 
Corporate governance in Jordan can be categorised into six dimensions: a legislative 
framework and government oversight, a capital market, disclosure and accounting standards, 
transparency in privatisation, effective supervision of the board of directors, preservation of 
property rights and protection of minority rights (Khoury 2003). These six dimensions are 
extensively stated in the Company Law of 1997 and its mandates of 2002, and some in the 
Securities Law of 2002. The controller of a company exerts a crucial role by enforcing the 
corporate-governance provisions of the Company Law (World Bank 2004). 
 
LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK AND GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT 
 
The legislative environment in Jordan has been the basis for the development of procedures 
for good corporate governance (Al-Basheer 2003). A number of laws have been 
implemented, such as the Company Law, Securities Law, Banking Law, Insurance Law, 
Commercial Law, Law of Competition and Monopoly, Law of Investment Promotion and 
Law of Privatisation (Al-Jazi 2007). According to a study conducted by Al-Jazi (2007), these 
laws focus on the following matters related to corporate governance:  
 The company’s legal personality is independent of its shareholders. The financial 
disclosure of the company is also independent from the financial disclosure to its 
shareholders.  
 The rights of ownership for companies and individuals include the disposition of 
assets and their transfer of ownership, mortgages or transfers of possession (in the 
case of movable property). The laws above govern the procedures and conditions of 
the acquisition and transfer of properties. 
 The legal structure of limited-liability companies includes the following bodies: the 
board of directors, the general shareholders and the audit committee. 
To regulate the accounting profession in Jordan and improve its corporate-governance 
environment, the Accountancy Profession Law No. 73 of 2003 was issued. The law is 
considered a critical part of corporate governance in Jordan because it provides a base for 
measuring a firm’s performance. Moreover, among other measures, it increased the role of 
the Jordanian Association of Certified Public Accounting (JACPA) and established the High 
Council of Accounting and Auditing. Although the law primarily focuses on the regulation of 
JACPA, it ignores factors such as the independence of auditors and compliance with auditing 
standards and professional ethics that could contribute to the improvement of the auditing 
profession (World Bank 2004).  
The Company Law provides some corporate governance rules in regards to the 
auditor of the corporation. It states requirements for what should be contained in the auditor's 
report and the way of appointing the auditor. The Company Law allows for the appointment 
of an auditor in an annual general shareholders’ meeting for a period of one year; the auditor 
should not be removed during the period of auditing except for reasons specified in the law. 
The independence of the auditor is protected by the law. The auditor reports an opinion about 
the financial statements to the general shareholders based on international standards of 
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INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK - CAPITAL MARKET 
 
Mangena and Chamisa (2008) have argued that building an institutional framework is the 
foundation of the best practice of corporate governance. In Jordan, the Securities Law created 
three important bodies: the Jordan Securities Commission (JSC), the Amman Stock Exchange 
(ASE) and the Securities Depository Center (SDC). They have a financial and administrative 
independence. The JSC consists of five independent members with full-time experience and 
competence. According to the Securities Law, its purpose is to protect investors from fraud 
and manipulation, provide an appropriate environment for safe trading in securities, and 
develop and monitor the stock market. According to the Securities Law, listed companies are 
subject to the control of the multi-related securities, such as licensed securities, accredited 
securities and exporters.   
Furthermore, the Securities Law provides an approach for activating the rules of 
governance: it defines market regulations, the issuance of shares or bonds and trade 
procedures. It also articulates the responsibility and obligations of issuers of securities, 
brokers and auditors, as well as the requirements for listing in the stock market, protection 
procedures for minority rights and requirements for the disclosure of important information. 
In order to maintain transparency, the law prohibits party transactions, promoting rumours, 
misleading investors and disclosing any matters that may adversely affect the capital market. 
  
DISCLOSURE AND ACCOUNTING STANDARDS  
 
Full disclosure and clear accounting standards are necessary for solid corporate governance 
(Rajagopalan & Zhang 2008). Therefore, the Company Law, the Banking Law, the Insurance 
Law, and the Securities Law require corporations to follow internationally accepted 
accounting and auditing standards. In 1994, Jordan fully adopted the international accounting 
standards, now called the International Financial Reporting Standards (Word Bank 2004).  
 
TRANSPARENCY IN PRIVATISATION  
 
During the 1990s, the Jordanian government adopted economic reforms aimed at increasing 
the private sector’s involvement in the economy; these included privatising some 
governmental companies and institutions (Shanikat 2007). The nature of the activities of 
these governmental companies and institutions requires them to be executed on a commercial 
basis in order to improve the level of services provided and raise the efficiency of the 
companies being privatised (Shanikat 2007). The Privatisation Law No. 25, enacted in 2000, 
formed a council for privatisation that has the authority to specify the value of the 
government’s contribution to companies. This law is considered one of the generators of 
good corporate governance, as it stipulates the transparency of the sale process, the disposal 
of privatisation revenues and compliance with the rules of transparency, openness and fair 
competition.  
 
EFFECTIVE SUPERVISION OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS  
 
The supervision of the board of directors is a crucial issue in corporate governance because 
the board is charged with advising, reviewing and evaluating the management (Gillan 2006). 
In Jordan, this also means that the board carries out the duties specified by the Company 
Law, including setting policies and planning for the management of the company and the 
appointment of the chief executive officer. The Company Law gives corporate management 
extensive power and obligations, including: 
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 Preparing the company's financial statements within three months of the end of the 
company's fiscal year, preparing the annual reports of the past year's performance and 
the prospects for the coming year and publishing the financial statements and annual 
reports within 30 days of the date of the AGM.  
 Maintaining internal control systems for financial and administrative accountability.  
 Inviting the company's shareholders to the AGM.  
To enhance corporate governance and efficiently control board functions, the 
Company Law regulates the conduct of meetings. For example, by the law, any board 
members, including chairpersons, lose their membership in the council if they fail to attend 
four consecutive meetings without an excuse acceptable to the Council, or if they are absent 
from meetings of the board for six consecutive months, even with an acceptable excuse for 
absenteeism. In addition, the board or any member of it may be dismissed by the public 
authority at the request of the shareholders holding at least 30% of the shares of the company.  
 The Securities Law covers the creation of an audit committee stemming from 
the board members. It states that the committee reports to the board of directors, makes 
recommendations to it, and exercises the following powers and functions:  
 Exercise control over the comprehensive audit.  
 Review the external audit reports and follow-up actions, the annual internal audit plan 
and inspection reports. 
 Audit financial statements before submitting them to the board of directors.  
 Ensure the accuracy of accounting and regulatory procedures.  
 Ensure overall compliance with laws and regulations.  
The law also organises the audit committee's meetings, ensuring that the committee 
meets once every three months or more often if the need arises. In order to activate the 
meeting, the director of internal audit invites appropriate attendees to be present at the audit 
committee's meeting.  
 
PROTECTION OF MINORITY RIGHTS  
 
The Company Law allows all shareholders to redress violations of their rights. Shareholders 
holding at least 15% of capital can ask the Companies Control Department (CCD) to audit 
the company. Also, they can seek redress with the CCD and the court for any violations 
conducted by the company's board, general manager and auditors (World Bank 2004).    
In 2005, the Amman Stock Exchange published the first edition of the Jordanian Code 
of Corporate Governance. This code's five chapters included definitions of key terminology; 
an overview of the board's structure and responsibilities; shareholder general meetings; 
shareholders' rights; and guidelines for financial disclosures along with a conceptual 
framework for accountability and auditing. The code also addressed issues of ownership 
structure and the characteristics of the capital market.  
However, this code is not actually enforced. The Disclosure Department in JSC is in 
charge of applying these rules, and all parties associated with the companies are expected to 
promote their application. This might be implemented through strengthening the management 
performance and thus enhancing the performance of the national economy and promoting the 
investment climate (Jordan Securities Commission 2005).  
Many of these rules were based on the binding legal texts contained in the legislation 
mentioned above. Generally, these are general rules, and, therefore, leave the details of their 
aspects and requirements to the relevant regulation. For example, there is no description of 
the information required in an annual report; this is left to the disclosure instructions of the 
issuance stock.  
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However, it must be noted that the business environment at the time was a motivating 
factor in adopting the Code. According to a study conducted by Khoury (2003), the 
distinctive features of the Jordanian business environment are: (1) some companies are 
family-owned and managed; (2) some limited-liability companies are not listed on the 
Amman Stock Exchange; (3) the Jordanian capital market is concentrated, with just a few 
companies holding more than 60% of the total share-market value; (4) raising awareness and 
education on corporate governance in public-sector institutions is considered unimportant; 
and (5) adequate disclosure and transparency instructions are required only for banks, 
insurance companies and market-listed companies.  
 
Study Methodology  
 
In this research, 20 interviews were carried out with key employees in 10 pioneer companies 
listed on the Amman Stock Exchange. These companies were chosen for several reasons: 
they are included in the stock index, their total capital market reaches JD 900 million and 
their shares are attractive to small investors.  
The interview questions revolved around assessing the reality of corporate governance 
in Jordan in terms of protecting shareholders' rights, corporate board composition and key 
functions, the reality of disclosure and transparency of the information the companies 
provided. The participants were chief executive officers, chief financial officers, chief 
accountants, human-resources managers and managers of shareholders' affairs.  
 
Assessment of Corporate Governance: Comparison with the Revised OECD Principles 
 
The study provides a key assessment that draws attention to the implementation of the Code.  
Specifically, the assessment examines:  (1) developing corporate governance that particularly 
focuses on the board’s structure, role and functions; (2) determining the extent of disclosure 
and transparency provisions; (3) reviewing the Company Law to assess the extent of 
enforcement and compliance with revised OECD principles; and (4) highlighting the 
institutional framework for overseeing the implementation of the Code. Table 1 summarises 
the assessment of corporate governance in Jordan.  
The protection of shareholders' rights includes secure methods of ownership 
registration, conveyance of transfer shares, the acquisition of relevant information on a timely 
and regularly basis, participation and the right to vote in shareholders’ general meetings, 
election of members of the board of directors and a share in the corporation's profits. The 
Securities Depository Center is responsible for keeping shareholders’ records and functions 
as a de facto center of ownership registration. The Center also handles the clearing and 
settlement of shares, which are transferable without any conditions. Periodic reports and 
audited annual reports should be provided to the JSC and the CDD. Also, some major events 
are disclosed upon occurrence. Shareholders have the right to participate in any general 
meeting,  to vote and to elect members of the board. The voting system is "one share, one 
vote".         
It seems that these rights are applied extensively, but there is no cumulative voting 
technique. This means that the big investors will get all the board seats. By the same token, it 
is difficult to remove any member.  One interview participant provided the following 
comment: 
I think, practically, small shareholders benefit only a little from their rights. For example, in 
this voting system you will never see any one of them a member on the board of directors. In fact, the 
possibility to change the current situation is small, because the majority of executives use their power 
to control how the related regulations are issued and applied. They are exercising the role of a pressure 
group.  





Result of the Assessment of Corporate Governance in Jordan 
PRINCIPLE 
ASSESSMENT BASE COMMENT 
In Law In Practice 





Practiced   
Shareholders participate in most fundamental 
decisions except major asset sales. 
Shareholders AGM rights are also mentioned, 
but there are no standard proxy forms and no 









The Controller sometimes acts on 
shareholders' complaints, but there is no 
formal complaint-resolution mechanism. 
There are solid regulations prohibiting insider 







Covered Practiced  
Stakeholder rights are respected.  
Stakeholders have a number of legal 
protections, which are widely covered in the 
Company Law. Companies typically adopt 
performance enhancement measures, such as 
employee savings funds. Employees 
sometimes share ownership in some 
companies' issues. Annual reports, by law, 
contain stakeholder information.  
4. DISCLOSURE AND 
TRANSPARENCY 
Covered Practiced 
Annual and semi-annual reports are provided, 
but only the annual report is required to be 
audited externally. Monitoring is limited only 
to quantity rather than quality of disclosures. 
There are no comprehensive and mandatory 
rules for corporate-governance disclosure. 
Jordan has fully adopted the IFRS and ISA 
standards for accounting and audits.  
5. 
RESPONSIBILITIES 




The board is liable for ensuring compliance 
with the law. In practice, there is no 
difference between the management and the 
board; generally the chairman and CEO are 
the same person. Stakeholders' duties are not 
clear. The law and regulations determine 
specific standards related to functions that the 
board should fulfill. By the law, directors 
have a right to access all relevant 
information.  
  
To ensure shareholders' rights, the controller should ensure that the process of the 
election of the board of director is conducted in a secret ballot. In this regard, one of the 
participants, number (5), comented as below and provided a suggestion for the current voting 
mechanism: 
"The government should have a serious role in imposing a fair voting system. I think it is a 
critical issue because it generally affects the economy of the country. I think the government can do a 
lot, for example, in order to increase the participation of the small shareholders in the board of 
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directors, the controller on behalf of the government can apply vote on a particular expert among the 
small shareholders so we can at least guarantee one seat into a board of directors ". 
Many regulations, particularly the Company Law, cover the participation of 
shareholders in general meetings. Shareholders should be given a sufficient amount of 
information about an upcoming general meeting (including date, location and agenda) in a 
timely manner.  The agenda should not include unspecified items such as "other business 
issues". Shareholders have the right to add items to the agenda before the meeting.  Annual 
general meetings are generally held within four to sixth months of the end of the financial 
year. Extraordinary meetings may be held under certain circumstances. The controller attends 
the annual general meeting; the JSC and the company's external auditor may attend as well. 
The chairman's statement, financial statements and auditor's report should be published in 
two local newspapers. Voting is allowed in person or by proxy.  
Proxies should be standard, not requiring a notary endorsement. Postal voting should 
be allowed as well. Most of this study's interview participants believe that it is necessary for 
small shareholders to attend the general meetings because it is their most basic right, and the 
most convenient way to encourage their attendance is to send a personal invitation. However, 
one participant specifically disagreed with encouraging the small shareholders to attend the 
general meeting:      
I think whether or not small shareholders attend the annual general or extraordinary meetings, 
nothing will change, because they don't have influence to impose their preferences or even provide 
suggestions. If the mechanism of voting changed then maybe they could participate effectively.  
Corporate governance should ensure that all shareholders have the same voting 
system and that investors obtain sufficient and appropriate information before making their 
investment decisions. In practice, the Company Law gives shareholders the right to take 
direct action against the directors, the general manager and the company's auditor in the event 
that they obtain inadequate disclosure. The shareholder can seek compensation with the CCD, 
who has a great deal of power in certain matters such as investigation and intervention. The 
law forbids directors, executive managers and employees from trading on information and 
revealing it to others. According to the law, they are subjected to fines and liable for any 
matter that may harm the company. According to the Securities Law, the JSC now monitors 
insider transactions automatically and compares them with its database. The Company Law 
also prevents party transactions, particularly between the board of directors, executive 
manager or any other insider knowledgeable of the company excluding family members. 
Also, according to the law, loans to the directors are forbidden.  
While the laws and regulations cover the equitable treatment of shareholders, related-
party transactions do not have a clear definition that includes affiliated and family-controlled 
companies. International financial-standards reporting requires disclosing any transactions 
that may affect the company as notices in the financial statements. Enforcing the disclosure 
should be a JSC priority and the audit committee should investigate all matters related to 
party transactions; however, the majority of companies have no audit committee.  
The Labor Law and Company Law also cover employee rights. The employee has the 
right to form professional unions, but these unions tend to be inefficient in practice. The 
Labor Law sets the minimum labour wage at JD 140 per month (US$200 per month), but it is 
not fully implemented. Also, there is no clear procedure for employees to seek equity if 
directors violate the law. One manager commented: 
I think labour rights aren’t guaranteed. For example, nowadays the management of any 
company can expel any employee without any reason, pretending this matter is due to restructuring the 
company, and the laws permit this. Regarding the minimum wage, I think a lot of companies don't 
apply it.  If they apply it, they reduce other rights. Regarding the role of labour unions, unfortunately, 
the majority of their leaders are looking out for their own interests, looking for social and political 
position and forgetting the labour rights and those who elected them to defend their rights.      
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The Company Law protects creditors' rights, so creditors can stop the reduction of a 
company’s capital. Also, the law provides special protection to the bondholders, so they have 
the right to form an assembly to safeguard their rights. According to the Company Law, 
creditors, bondholders and shareholders can raise an objection to the controller and have the 
right to make a claim against the directors in the case of a violation of the law. While the 
employees do not have any rights in terms of accessing and obtaining information and 
participating in decision-making, the Company Law states that companies must show in their 
annual reports information about the staff structure and other issues related to employees, 
such as the hiring policy, the number of employees and training programs. One manager 
commented on the issue of training: 
The companies, especially the large ones, now are taking into account the need for qualified 
employees. They believe that as much as they have skilled employees it is possible to achieve their 
objective perfectly. So, a lot of companies set hiring rules to attract only qualified employees. 
Corporate governance should ensure that full disclosures are made in all matters 
related to the company. The Company Law and Securities Law, in particular, cover this 
principle extensively. Audited financial statements are sent to the Jordan Securities 
Commission during the three months after the end of the financial year. All events that could 
affect the company’s future performance, such as the company’s profitability and financial 
position, must be disclosed in the annual report. In practice, a company’s objectives are set 
before registration at the Ministry of Industry and Trade. The board of directors is obligated 
to report the company's general plan for the coming three years.   
The information in annual reports should be declared to the public immediately after 
providing it to the JSC. The JSC should increase its efforts to ensure timely declarations. 
Annual reports contain information about the board of directors such as the number of their 
shares, the duration of their membership and their annual compensation. Any investors who 
hold at least 5% of shares should be disclosed. Environmental issues should be included in 
the annual report. All these issues and others are observed largely in both, or covered by both, 
the Company Law and the Securities Law.  
The Company Law states that listed companies should adopt International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) and International Standards Accounting (ISA). Auditors' 
opinions must be in accordance with IFRS, and financial statements must agree with the 
company's records. In practice, financial statements and related information are reviewed by 
the auditor. The auditor is appointed in the annual general meeting, but in practice, the board 
of directors, not the audit committee, is in charge of the nomination of the auditor. Many 
issues related to the auditor, such as audit fees as discussed in the AGM, auditor attendance 
of the AGM, and clarification to the shareholders about the content of financial statement 
information, are covered in the Company Law. In general, financial statements appear to be 
prepared according to high standards since the adoption of IFRS.  
The auditing market is dominated by the big auditing firms and a few smaller national 
auditors. However, the majority of the auditing firms operating in Jordan are of low quality.  
According to the new Accounting Law, which was issued in 2004, an auditor obtains a 
license from the Higher Auditing Commission. Some of these issues were commented on by 
one of the managers: 
I worked as assistant auditor for more than five years. I had several attempts to pass the 
auditing test in order to get licensed as a Jordanian CPA, but unfortunately, I failed, like a lot of people. 
I think the main reasons behind that are that there are a few old auditors who are dominating the 
auditing market and they don't allow a new professional to enter this sector. Another reason is in 
regards to the exam itself.  There are no clear subjects, no specific books and no specific committee to 
manage the exam. Now, I have been working in the banking sector for more than 10 years, and to my 
knowledge, I have never heard that an auditor issued an adverse or disclaimer opinion.     
Concerning responsibility of the board of directors, the corporate governance 
framework should insure a regular controlling of management, and the accountability of the 
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board to the company and the shareholders. In Accordance with the Company Law, a board 
consists of between three and 13 members. The directors must be shareholders and should be 
elected by them in the annual general meeting. They are elected for a four-year term and can 
be removed before the end of their term. One director can be elected as a chief executive 
officer. In Jordan, directors and management of companies are usually dominated by a few 
business families, so boards' accountability, liability and independence are questionable. One 
manager asserted: 
I think the boards of directors aren’t active and their independence, in practice, isn't applied 
efficiently.  The reason behind that is a majority of shareholder companies are managed by families. 
Although these companies are pioneers in their industry and their performance is successful, the 
problematic issue is that the board’s first priority is to fulfill the family’s interests in term of 
profitability and increasing their wealth. I think the law should establish rules to prevent such 
situations. I mean the law should guarantee diversity within the boards. I think such actions will 
enhance the companies' performance. I would like to point to another issue, that the governmental 
representative, unfortunately, is not active and is just applying the government’s orders, sometimes 
regardless of the company’s interest. 
The Company Law and Securities Law consist of several articles that manipulate 
issues related to boards of directors, such as their composition, role, functions, accountability, 
responsibility and independence. Policymakers should also consider issues such as 
encouraging the independence and enhancing the diversity of board members' technical and 
business backgrounds. In addition, although the JSC-issued guidelines for corporate 
governance provide detailed rules for boards of directors in Jordan, these guidelines still need 
the power of enforcement behind them. The Corporate Governance Code should ensure that 
new boards obtain full information about the company. This issue was pointed out by a 
manager: 
I believe that the company must provide a full and comprehensive file that contains 
information about the company so that the new members of board would be familiar with the 
company's conditions; this information should include the company's weaknesses and strengths. I think 
it’s the right of each member of the board of directors to get full knowledge about the company’s 
development. 
The Company Law extensively covers the board's functions. The board is considered 
the top level of the corporation and is responsible for monitoring and achieving the 
company's goals and plans (which are, to a large extent, set at the annual general meeting). 
The board also appoints, compensates and replaces the chief executive officer. The board 
submits the audited financial statements, which are reviewed by the audit committee at the 
annual general meeting. The board is responsible for the accuracy of all information, 
financial and non-financial, included in the annual report. The annual report should be signed 
by the chief executive officer and the chief financial officer. Also, the board's compensation 
is determined by law at 10 percent of the net profits, not to exceed a maximum of JD 50004 
per year. It is obvious that the board's key functions are largely observed in Jordanian 
companies.   
 
Conclusions and Recommendations  
 
This study’s primary contribution to the literature is the mechanism of assessment of 
corporate governance, by taking into account the major corporate governance principles 
issued by OECD basic shareholders rights, equitable treatment of shareholders, the role of 
stakeholders in corporate governance and disclosure and transparency.  The paper makes five 
additional contributions to the literature.  
                                                 
4   JD 1= US$ 1.42. 
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Basic shareholder rights are examined. Shareholders participate in most of the 
fundamental decisions except major asset sales. Shareholders' rights regarding annual general 
meetings are noted, but there are no standard proxy forms and no postal voting.  
Equitable treatment of shareholders virtually does not exist. The CCD sometimes 
handles complaints from shareholders, but there is no formal mechanism. Insider trading is 
prohibited by solid insider-trading regulations. Related-party transaction rules are not clear. 
Stakeholders have a significant role in corporate governance, and stakeholder rights 
are respected.  Stakeholders have a number of legal protections under the Company Law. 
Companies typically adopt performance enhancement, such as employee savings funds. 
Employees sometimes share ownership in some company issues. By law, annual reports 
contain information about stakeholders.  
Annual and semi-annual reports offer some disclosure and transparency, but only the 
annual report must be audited by an external auditor. Monitoring is limited only to quantity 
rather than quality of disclosure. There are no comprehensive and mandatory rules for 
corporate-governance disclosure. Jordan has fully adopted IFRS and ISA as their standards 
for accounting and auditing.  
The board is liable for ensuring compliance with the law. In practice, there is no 
difference between the management and the board, as generally the chairman and chief 
executive officer are the same person. Furthermore, stakeholders have no   clear duties. The 
laws and regulations are determined by specific standards related to functions that the board 
should fulfil. Under the Company Law, directors have a right to access all relevant 
information. 
Future research papers will focus on the effect of corporate-governance codes on 
firms' performance. At the end of the last decade of the 20th century and the beginning of the 
21st, many of the Jordanian governmental companies have privatised; thus the relationship 
between corporate governance and newly privatised companies could be another rich area to 
study.   
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